The United States Supreme Court reigned in "Big Brother" today with its decision in United States v. Jones, holding that the Government must first obtain a search warrant before installing and monitoring a G.P.S. device on a suspects vehicle.
In a day where increased unmanned observation of citizens seems to be an all but accepted way of life with traffic cameras, invasive airport scanners and other similar technology, today's decision by the Supreme Court is a refreshing reminder of the importance of the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court's ruling can best be summarized as follows: The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the "right of the people to be secure in their person's houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." The Government's physical intrusion (installation of a tracking device) on an individual's "effect" (vehicle) for the purposes of obtaining information constitutes a "search." Consequently a search warrant is required prior to the intrusion. (See Your Rights).
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution has long protected citizens from governmental intrusion into their private affairs. Although not as commonly discussed, the Fourth Amendment also stands as a stout protector of private property from governmental interference or intrusion. Justice Scalia, delivering the opinion of the Court, emphasized and reiterated the proud and longstanding tradition that the protection of private property, made possible through the Fourth Amendment, has in our country. He emphasized: "It is important to be clear about what occurred in this case: The Government physically occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining information. We have no doubt that such a physical intrusion would have been considered a 'search' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it was adopted." Justice Scalia then quoted the historical explanation by Lord Camden: "Our law holds the property of every man so sacred, that no man can set his foot upon his neighbour's close without his leave; if he does he is a trespasser, though he does no damage at all; if he will tread upon his neighbour's ground, he must justify it by law."
The Government argued that Jones it should not matter that they trespassed on Jone's private effects because he did not have a "reasonable expectation of privacy" in the area of the vehicle accessed by the Government agents (its underbody) and in the location of the vehicle on the public roads, and thus, no Fourth Amendment violation took place. They made this argument relying upon two prior cases decided by the Supreme Court where it held that placement of a "beeper" into a container that was subsequently transported by a defendant and tracked by law enforcement did not qualify as a "search." However, the Supreme Court rejected that argument, pointing out that those two cases (United States v. Knotts and United States v. Karo) involved placement of the tracking device on the property with the "then owner's" permission. Consequently, there was no "trespass" against the individual's property as was the case in Jones, where the agents installed the device on his private property, without his nor anyone else permission.
It is also notable that there was considerable debate between the Justices regarding what the proper approach should be for determining whether a "search occurs" in future cases not involving a physical trespass to a person's property. However, that debate is better left for the legal academics and future cases to ferret out. The key to this case is this: When the government physically invades personal property to gather information, a search occurs within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. If no search warrant or exception to the warrant requirement exists at that time, then the search is illegal and all evidence obtained as a result of the illegal search must be suppressed (thrown out of court).
On an interesting side note, none of this would have been an issue had law enforcement did what they were supposed to do in the first place. Law enforcement initially obtained a search warrant to install the GPS unit on Jones' vehicle but did so a day late and a State short. The warrant required the installation of the device in the District of Columbia within 10 days from the date it was issued. Unfortunately, the agents installed the device in the State of Maryland on the 11th day. Consequently, the warrant did not authorize the installation and the Court had to analyze the case as if no warrant had been issued at all. This is a classic example of had law enforcement done their job correctly in the first place, we wouldn't even be talking about this.
Showing posts with label search warrant. Show all posts
Showing posts with label search warrant. Show all posts
Monday, January 23, 2012
Friday, August 19, 2011
Smell of Marijuana and Probable Cause
It is not uncommon for police officers to claim that they "immediately detected a strong odor of marijuana" coming from the vehicle, apartment or house. They then use that in an attempt to justify a subsequent search of the car or residence. This begs the question: does the smell of marijuana, standing alone, create probable cause to search? The answer is "yes but ..."
According to the Iowa Supreme Court's recent decision in State v. Watts, the odor of marijuana, burnt or fresh, may create probable cause to search a particular location so long as a few requirements are met. First, the State is required to establish that the odor is sufficiently distinctive to identify a forbidden substance and second, the they must establish the training and qualifications supporting the officer's conclusion that the odor was indeed marijuana. In other words, they have to prove that the officer has sufficient training and knowledge to allow him to accurately and reliably detect and identify the odor as being from marijuana. Establishing prior experience in narcotics enforcement investigations is ordinarily sufficient.
These requirement are based upon the United States Supreme Court's decision from 1948 in Johnson v. United States where the Court stated: "If the presence of odors is testified to before a magistrate and he finds the affiant qualified to known the odor, and it is one sufficiently distinctive to identify a forbidden substance, this Court has never held such a basis insufficient to justify issuance of a search warrant." Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1948). The Iowa Supreme Court has followed that reasoning and in State v. Watts, reconfirmed those requirements.
If the State can establish the required foundation pertaining to the odor of marijuana, probable cause is shown to exist. The next question then becomes was a warrant obtained or was the search conducted without a warrant. If a search warrant was obtained, the application for the search warrant must contain sworn information regarding the officers qualification and experience in detecting the odor or the search warrant will not be valid. The prosecution is not allowed to add to the warrant application or present additional evidence that is not contained in the warrant application once the warrant is approved. What's written in the application at the time it is submitted to the judge or magistrate will determine whether or not probable cause has been established.
If the officers proceed to search without a warrant, they must be able to prove that an exception to the search warrant requirement existed. The most common exceptions are: 1) exigent (emergency) circumstances, such as the immediate threat of evidence destruction; 2) consent; 3) search incident to arrest; or 4) plain view. In most cases law enforcement will attempt to rely upon either emergency circumstances or consent. Remember, a person is NEVER required to consent to a search of their person or property. For more information on your rights pertaining to searches, click here.
Emergency circumstances automatically exist when the smell is coming from a vehicle. Right or wrong, the Supreme Court has held that the inherent mobility of a vehicle creates the danger that the evidence will be destroyed or otherwise dissapear if the vehicle is not searched. For apartments, houses or other residences, the State must establish particular facts that reasonably lead them to conclude evidence is in imminent danger of being destroyed before they may proceed to enter a house without a search warrant. In Watts, the prosecution attempted to argue that the officer was justified in entering the apartment without a warrant "because he didn't know if there were any other individuals inside the residence" that could attempt to destroy evidence. The Iowa Supreme Court said that it is not enough "not to know." Rather, there must be specific information that reasonably leads the officers to believe there are individuals inside the residence that pose an immediate threat of destroying the evidence. Hearing movement and scurrying around within the residence may be sufficient to meet that burden.
In conclusion, the smell of marijuana detected by a trained and qualified individual who is shown to be familiar with the odor, can create probable cause to search. However, it is important to ensure that the proper foundation for that evidence is established. It is equally important to ensure that those facts are sufficiently set forth in the search warrant application or if no search warrant was obtained, that the State can meet its burden of proving that an exception to the warrant requirement existed at the time of the search. It is the seemingly little details that can make a huge difference in search and seizure cases.
KNOW YOUR RIGHTS, EXERCISE YOUR RIGHTS, PRESERVE YOUR FREEDOM.
According to the Iowa Supreme Court's recent decision in State v. Watts, the odor of marijuana, burnt or fresh, may create probable cause to search a particular location so long as a few requirements are met. First, the State is required to establish that the odor is sufficiently distinctive to identify a forbidden substance and second, the they must establish the training and qualifications supporting the officer's conclusion that the odor was indeed marijuana. In other words, they have to prove that the officer has sufficient training and knowledge to allow him to accurately and reliably detect and identify the odor as being from marijuana. Establishing prior experience in narcotics enforcement investigations is ordinarily sufficient.
These requirement are based upon the United States Supreme Court's decision from 1948 in Johnson v. United States where the Court stated: "If the presence of odors is testified to before a magistrate and he finds the affiant qualified to known the odor, and it is one sufficiently distinctive to identify a forbidden substance, this Court has never held such a basis insufficient to justify issuance of a search warrant." Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1948). The Iowa Supreme Court has followed that reasoning and in State v. Watts, reconfirmed those requirements.
If the State can establish the required foundation pertaining to the odor of marijuana, probable cause is shown to exist. The next question then becomes was a warrant obtained or was the search conducted without a warrant. If a search warrant was obtained, the application for the search warrant must contain sworn information regarding the officers qualification and experience in detecting the odor or the search warrant will not be valid. The prosecution is not allowed to add to the warrant application or present additional evidence that is not contained in the warrant application once the warrant is approved. What's written in the application at the time it is submitted to the judge or magistrate will determine whether or not probable cause has been established.
If the officers proceed to search without a warrant, they must be able to prove that an exception to the search warrant requirement existed. The most common exceptions are: 1) exigent (emergency) circumstances, such as the immediate threat of evidence destruction; 2) consent; 3) search incident to arrest; or 4) plain view. In most cases law enforcement will attempt to rely upon either emergency circumstances or consent. Remember, a person is NEVER required to consent to a search of their person or property. For more information on your rights pertaining to searches, click here.
Emergency circumstances automatically exist when the smell is coming from a vehicle. Right or wrong, the Supreme Court has held that the inherent mobility of a vehicle creates the danger that the evidence will be destroyed or otherwise dissapear if the vehicle is not searched. For apartments, houses or other residences, the State must establish particular facts that reasonably lead them to conclude evidence is in imminent danger of being destroyed before they may proceed to enter a house without a search warrant. In Watts, the prosecution attempted to argue that the officer was justified in entering the apartment without a warrant "because he didn't know if there were any other individuals inside the residence" that could attempt to destroy evidence. The Iowa Supreme Court said that it is not enough "not to know." Rather, there must be specific information that reasonably leads the officers to believe there are individuals inside the residence that pose an immediate threat of destroying the evidence. Hearing movement and scurrying around within the residence may be sufficient to meet that burden.
In conclusion, the smell of marijuana detected by a trained and qualified individual who is shown to be familiar with the odor, can create probable cause to search. However, it is important to ensure that the proper foundation for that evidence is established. It is equally important to ensure that those facts are sufficiently set forth in the search warrant application or if no search warrant was obtained, that the State can meet its burden of proving that an exception to the warrant requirement existed at the time of the search. It is the seemingly little details that can make a huge difference in search and seizure cases.
KNOW YOUR RIGHTS, EXERCISE YOUR RIGHTS, PRESERVE YOUR FREEDOM.
Friday, May 9, 2008
Warrant? We don't need no stinking warrant!
Whatever happened to the idea that a warrant is required except for in few jealously guarded and carefully drawn exceptions where the delay necessary to obtain a warrant is outweighed by the compelling necessity for immediate action?!
It has long been recognized that the purpose behind the 4th Amendment's warrant requirement is to ensure that when time permits, law enforcement must present evidence that they believe creates probable cause to a neutral and detached magistrate for an independent determination. The rule has always been, when time permits a warrant must be obtained because the United States Constitution has always required that an impartial judgment of a judicial officer be imposed between the citizen and the police who are often engaged in what has been described as the "competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." Personal privacy has always been of utmost concern in our nation. The United States Supreme Court could not have been clearer regarding the importance of a search warrant when it stated in Katz v. United States:
“The Government urges that, because its agents relied upon the decisions in Olmstead and Goldman, and because they did no more here than they might properly have done with prior judicial sanction, we should retroactively validate their conduct. That we cannot do. It is apparent that the agents in this case acted with restraint. Yet the inescapable fact is that this restraint was imposed by the agents themselves, not by a judicial officer. They were not required, before commencing the search, to present their estimate of probable cause for detached scrutiny by a neutral magistrate. They were not compelled, during the conduct of the search itself, to observe precise limits established in advance by a specific court order. Nor were they directed, after the search had been completed, to notify the authorizing magistrate in detail of all that had been seized. In the absence of such safeguards, this Court has never sustained a search upon the sole ground that officers reasonably expected to find evidence of a particular crime and voluntarily confined their activities to the least intrusive means consistent with that end. Searches conducted without warrants have been held unlawful ‘notwithstanding facts unquestionably showing probable cause,’ Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33, for the Constitution requires ‘that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer * * * be interposed between the citizen and the police * * *.’ Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82. ‘Over and again this Court has emphasized that the mandate of the (Fourth) Amendment requires adherence to judicial processes,’ United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51, and that searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356-57 (1967).
Evidently, in situations involving the search of motor vehicles for narcotics, these fundamental principals as set forth by the United States Supreme Court have become nothing more then empty rhetoric to the Iowa Supreme Court. On Friday, May 10th, the Iowa Supreme Court in State v. Allensworth http://www.judicial.state.ia.us/Supreme_Court/Recent_Opinions/20080509/06-1507.pdf held that even when an automobile is impounded and is safely secured within the possession of law enforcement, police do not have to obtain a warrant to search the entire vehicle if they discover contraband pursuant to their "impound inventory" of the vehicle. Even though the officers had all the time in the world to obtain a search warrant signed and approved by a neutral and detached magistrate, the Supreme Court held that a search warrant was not necessary because the discovery of the narcotics during a inventory search provided probable cause to search the entire vehicle. This included removing the horn cap to discover the concealed narcotics. The Court justified the search under the "automobile exception" to the search warrant requirement.
The "automobile exception" to the warrant requirement has its roots in the well-recognized exception of probable cause coupled with exigent circumstances wherein law enforcement is permitted to forgo the search warrant process because an emergency situation justifies conducting a search to preserve life or evidence that is immanently in danger. With the "automobile exception" the rationale is that the vehicle's "inherent mobility" created the exigent circumstances because if it were not searched the occupants would be able to drive off and the evidence or contraband would be lost forever. Thus, so long as probable cause existed to believe the vehicle contained evidence it's inherent mobility justified the immediate search under the probable cause + exigent circumstances exception. Initially, if properly limited, this exception was at least supported by some form of logic, whether right or wrong.
Over time the "automobile exception" has been bastardized (as have the majority of the theoretically "carefully drawn and jealously guarded" exceptions to the warrant requirement) to the point we have arrived at today. The mobility of the vehicle, which is the entire premise upon which this exception is based, is no longer the primary concern. In fact, it is of absolutely no concern whatsoever. Prior to the Iowa Supreme Court's decision in Allensworth, the focus under the "automobile exception" was the mobility of the vehicle at the time probable cause arose. For example, in State v. Olsen, the Iowa Supreme Court held that so long as probable cause arose on the scene, law enforcement could impound the vehicle and take it to the station for a thorough search and they did not need to conduct the search on the side of the road. The rationale was that because they could have searched the vehicle on the side of the road it was not unreasonable to take it to the safety and security of the station to perform the search. Now, under Allensworth, the mobility of the vehicle becomes absolutely irrelevant. In Allensworth, the vehicle was completely immobilized when the narcotics were discovered in the vehicle pursuant to the inventory search. There was no pressing for time, no emergency situation, no exigency whatsoever. Law enforcement had all the time in the world to obtain a warrant by presenting their findings to a neutral and detached magistrate. The Iowa Supreme Court has taken the "automobile exception" to an entirely new height. The mobility of the vehicle, which was initially the justification for the exception in the first place, now is completely irrelevant. This exception has come full circle.
This decision begs the question of "what's next?" A vehicle broken down and on blocks is still considered mobile because it is an automobile? As far as the Iowa Supreme Court is concerned when it comes to searches of vehicles, they have now take the position of: Warrant? We don't need no stinking warrant! Hopefully the defendant will request that this decision be reviewed by the United States Supreme Court and one can only pray for a better resolution there.
It has long been recognized that the purpose behind the 4th Amendment's warrant requirement is to ensure that when time permits, law enforcement must present evidence that they believe creates probable cause to a neutral and detached magistrate for an independent determination. The rule has always been, when time permits a warrant must be obtained because the United States Constitution has always required that an impartial judgment of a judicial officer be imposed between the citizen and the police who are often engaged in what has been described as the "competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." Personal privacy has always been of utmost concern in our nation. The United States Supreme Court could not have been clearer regarding the importance of a search warrant when it stated in Katz v. United States:
“The Government urges that, because its agents relied upon the decisions in Olmstead and Goldman, and because they did no more here than they might properly have done with prior judicial sanction, we should retroactively validate their conduct. That we cannot do. It is apparent that the agents in this case acted with restraint. Yet the inescapable fact is that this restraint was imposed by the agents themselves, not by a judicial officer. They were not required, before commencing the search, to present their estimate of probable cause for detached scrutiny by a neutral magistrate. They were not compelled, during the conduct of the search itself, to observe precise limits established in advance by a specific court order. Nor were they directed, after the search had been completed, to notify the authorizing magistrate in detail of all that had been seized. In the absence of such safeguards, this Court has never sustained a search upon the sole ground that officers reasonably expected to find evidence of a particular crime and voluntarily confined their activities to the least intrusive means consistent with that end. Searches conducted without warrants have been held unlawful ‘notwithstanding facts unquestionably showing probable cause,’ Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33, for the Constitution requires ‘that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer * * * be interposed between the citizen and the police * * *.’ Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82. ‘Over and again this Court has emphasized that the mandate of the (Fourth) Amendment requires adherence to judicial processes,’ United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51, and that searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356-57 (1967).
Evidently, in situations involving the search of motor vehicles for narcotics, these fundamental principals as set forth by the United States Supreme Court have become nothing more then empty rhetoric to the Iowa Supreme Court. On Friday, May 10th, the Iowa Supreme Court in State v. Allensworth http://www.judicial.state.ia.us/Supreme_Court/Recent_Opinions/20080509/06-1507.pdf held that even when an automobile is impounded and is safely secured within the possession of law enforcement, police do not have to obtain a warrant to search the entire vehicle if they discover contraband pursuant to their "impound inventory" of the vehicle. Even though the officers had all the time in the world to obtain a search warrant signed and approved by a neutral and detached magistrate, the Supreme Court held that a search warrant was not necessary because the discovery of the narcotics during a inventory search provided probable cause to search the entire vehicle. This included removing the horn cap to discover the concealed narcotics. The Court justified the search under the "automobile exception" to the search warrant requirement.
The "automobile exception" to the warrant requirement has its roots in the well-recognized exception of probable cause coupled with exigent circumstances wherein law enforcement is permitted to forgo the search warrant process because an emergency situation justifies conducting a search to preserve life or evidence that is immanently in danger. With the "automobile exception" the rationale is that the vehicle's "inherent mobility" created the exigent circumstances because if it were not searched the occupants would be able to drive off and the evidence or contraband would be lost forever. Thus, so long as probable cause existed to believe the vehicle contained evidence it's inherent mobility justified the immediate search under the probable cause + exigent circumstances exception. Initially, if properly limited, this exception was at least supported by some form of logic, whether right or wrong.
Over time the "automobile exception" has been bastardized (as have the majority of the theoretically "carefully drawn and jealously guarded" exceptions to the warrant requirement) to the point we have arrived at today. The mobility of the vehicle, which is the entire premise upon which this exception is based, is no longer the primary concern. In fact, it is of absolutely no concern whatsoever. Prior to the Iowa Supreme Court's decision in Allensworth, the focus under the "automobile exception" was the mobility of the vehicle at the time probable cause arose. For example, in State v. Olsen, the Iowa Supreme Court held that so long as probable cause arose on the scene, law enforcement could impound the vehicle and take it to the station for a thorough search and they did not need to conduct the search on the side of the road. The rationale was that because they could have searched the vehicle on the side of the road it was not unreasonable to take it to the safety and security of the station to perform the search. Now, under Allensworth, the mobility of the vehicle becomes absolutely irrelevant. In Allensworth, the vehicle was completely immobilized when the narcotics were discovered in the vehicle pursuant to the inventory search. There was no pressing for time, no emergency situation, no exigency whatsoever. Law enforcement had all the time in the world to obtain a warrant by presenting their findings to a neutral and detached magistrate. The Iowa Supreme Court has taken the "automobile exception" to an entirely new height. The mobility of the vehicle, which was initially the justification for the exception in the first place, now is completely irrelevant. This exception has come full circle.
This decision begs the question of "what's next?" A vehicle broken down and on blocks is still considered mobile because it is an automobile? As far as the Iowa Supreme Court is concerned when it comes to searches of vehicles, they have now take the position of: Warrant? We don't need no stinking warrant! Hopefully the defendant will request that this decision be reviewed by the United States Supreme Court and one can only pray for a better resolution there.
Friday, May 2, 2008
Warrants Require Neutral and Detached Magistrate
"The magistrate approving the warrant must not be an eager (or sullen) police apparatchik or agent." Justice Appel - State v. Freemont citing Johnson v. United States, 333 U.s. 10 (1948).
On May 2, 2008, the Iowa Supreme Court reversed the felony drug and child endangerment convictions of Guy Fremont and Lacy Nelson because the part-time magistrate that issued the search warrant for their residence was not "neutral and detached" as required by the 4th and 14th Amendments to the United States Constitution.
In State v. Freemont the issuing magistrate, although presented with overwhelming evidence establishing probable cause to search the warrant, improperly authorized the search warrant because he was at the time, also representing the father of the child of Freemont's girlfriend who was living at the residence to be searched, in a pending custody and child support dispute. Obviously his client would benefit from drugs being found in his child's mother's residence and would benefit even more if charges were brought against her. The Court recognized that: "A successful search of the home, which sought to find evidence of drug offenses, could make the position of the mother more difficult in the child custody matter and advance the position of the father. . . . A drug charge in a child custody dispute is a very serious matter and goes to the core of the fundamental question in child custody matters -- the best interests of the child." The court concluded: "Under the unusual circumstances of this case, we conclude that the magistrate had a nonpecuniary personal interest in the matter that objectively cast doubt on his ability to hold the balance, nice, clear and true, between the state and the accused." "The magistrate's simultaneous and conflicting dual roles rendered him unable to meet the requirements of a neutral and detached magistrate under the Fourth Amendment."
While it would seem common sense that the magistrate in this case was not "neutral and detached", decades of prior case law did make the issue a little murky. Justice Appel writing for the Court did a great job of reviewing the prior precedent and clearly enunciating why the magistrate's conflict not only violated the requirement that he be "neutral and detached" but also resulted in a violation of the 4th Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment. Finally, the Court concluded that the harmless error analysis was not appropriate in these situations because "an invalid warrant is the equivalent of no warrant at all" and thus, the harmless error analysis cannot and does not apply in these situations.
The entire decision can be obtained at: http://www.judicial.state.ia.us/Supreme_Court/Recent_Opinions/20080502/06-1443.pdf
On May 2, 2008, the Iowa Supreme Court reversed the felony drug and child endangerment convictions of Guy Fremont and Lacy Nelson because the part-time magistrate that issued the search warrant for their residence was not "neutral and detached" as required by the 4th and 14th Amendments to the United States Constitution.
In State v. Freemont the issuing magistrate, although presented with overwhelming evidence establishing probable cause to search the warrant, improperly authorized the search warrant because he was at the time, also representing the father of the child of Freemont's girlfriend who was living at the residence to be searched, in a pending custody and child support dispute. Obviously his client would benefit from drugs being found in his child's mother's residence and would benefit even more if charges were brought against her. The Court recognized that: "A successful search of the home, which sought to find evidence of drug offenses, could make the position of the mother more difficult in the child custody matter and advance the position of the father. . . . A drug charge in a child custody dispute is a very serious matter and goes to the core of the fundamental question in child custody matters -- the best interests of the child." The court concluded: "Under the unusual circumstances of this case, we conclude that the magistrate had a nonpecuniary personal interest in the matter that objectively cast doubt on his ability to hold the balance, nice, clear and true, between the state and the accused." "The magistrate's simultaneous and conflicting dual roles rendered him unable to meet the requirements of a neutral and detached magistrate under the Fourth Amendment."
While it would seem common sense that the magistrate in this case was not "neutral and detached", decades of prior case law did make the issue a little murky. Justice Appel writing for the Court did a great job of reviewing the prior precedent and clearly enunciating why the magistrate's conflict not only violated the requirement that he be "neutral and detached" but also resulted in a violation of the 4th Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment. Finally, the Court concluded that the harmless error analysis was not appropriate in these situations because "an invalid warrant is the equivalent of no warrant at all" and thus, the harmless error analysis cannot and does not apply in these situations.
The entire decision can be obtained at: http://www.judicial.state.ia.us/Supreme_Court/Recent_Opinions/20080502/06-1443.pdf
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